Supreme Court Cases

Latest Supreme Court Judgments


Totally, ten accused were tried, including the appellant herein, for the offences punishable under sections 147, 148, 307, 302, 459, 460, 120-B, 118 and 176 read with section 149 of the Indian Penal Code, and section 3/25 of the Arms Act.
The Trial Court acquitted accused Nos. 7 to 10 and convicted accused Nos. 1 to 5, viz., Gyan Singh, Shiv Singh, Indal, Rajveer and Prabhu Dayal (the appellant herein) (accused No. 6 – Babu expired during investigation). Gyan Singh was convicted under section 302, I.P.C. simpliciter, and was sentenced to life imprisonment with a fine of Rs. 1,000/-. Shiv Singh was convicted under section 307, I.P.C., and sentenced to simple imprisonment of 4 years with fine. The rest of the accused, including Indal, Rajveer, and Prabhu Dayal, were convincted under Ss. 302/149, I.P.C. and given the same sentence as Gyan Singh. During the pendency of the appeal before the High Court, one of the accused – Indal expired. Thus, the appeal was heard by the High Court against four accused, namely, Gyan Singh, Shiv Shiv Singh, Rajveer and Prabhu Dayal. The High Court on hearing, while acquitting the accused – Rajveer, has confirmed the judgment of conviction passed by the Trial Court in respect of Gyan Singh, Shiv Singh and Prabhu Dayal.

The accused – Gyan Singh has served the sentence of imprisonment and he has not filed an appeal in this Court. The accused – Shiv Singh did not choose to file an appeal and consequently has accepted the judgment of conviction and sentence passed against him. Hence, the accused – Prabhu Dayal is the only person who is before this Court in this appeal, questioning the judgment and order of conviction passed against him.

Hon’ble L.N. Rao and M.M. Shantanagoudar, JJ., have held that in our considered opinion, the Trial Court as well as the High Court is also justified in concluding that the appellant is liable to be convicted under section 149 of the I.P.C., inasmuch as he is one of the members of the unlawful assembly who had come to the scene of occurrence with the common object of committing the murder of Gopal.

The misfired catridge, the fired cartridge, and the country made pistols were subjected to the examination of the Forensic Science Laboratory. It was clearly stated in the Forensic Laboratory’s Reports that the country made pistol contained in packet ‘H’ was in working order. However, it has a tendency to mis-fire the ammunition. It is also stated that the cartridge found in the very packet was fireworthy ammunition. The report of the Ballistic Expert further makes it clear that based on stereo and comparison microscopic examination, the 12-bore cartridge case from packet ‘G’ could have been fired from a 12-bore country made pistol. Hence, it is clear that out of the two pistols seized, one pistol had got a tendency to mis-fire and the other had fireworthy ammunition. Thus, the reports of the Forensic Science Laboratory fully support the case of the prosecution, inasmuch as it is the evidence of the witnesses including Devi that Gopal was fired at by Gyan Singh as well as the appellant herein. Among the shots fired, one of the gunshots was mis-fired. Be that as it may, the fact remains, as mentioned supra, that all the five members including the appellant were members of the unlawful assembly which had the common object of committing the murder of the deceased. Hence, in our considered opinion, the Trial Court and the High Court are justified in convicting the accused having regard to the evidence on record.
Prabhu Dayal v. State of Rajasthan, 2018 (188) AIC 1 SC

Executing Court only concerned with execution part

The whole purpose of execution proceeding is to enforce the verdict of the Court. Executing Court while executing the decree is only concerned with the execution part of it but nothing else. The Court has to take the judgment in its face value. It is settled law that Execution Court cannot go beyond the decree. But the difficulty arises when there is ambiguity in the decree with regard to the material aspects. Then it becomes the bounden duty of the Court to interpret the decree in the process of giving a true effect to the decree. At that juncture the Executing Court has to be very cautious in supplementing its interpretation and conscious of the fact that it cannot draw a new decree. The Executing Court shall strike a fine balance between the two while exercising this jurisdiction in the process of giving effect to the decree.

Hon’ble N.V. Ramana and S. Abdul Nazeer, JJ., have held that admittedly, during the pendency of the execution proceedings an amount of Rs. 4,86,953 as 90% value of 11,875.75 Euros as on 24.4.2002 and interest thereon of Rs. 6,33,653 as directed by the Court were paid by the respondent herein. Both the State Commission and District Commission interpreted the order dated 12.10.2006 observing that Euro conversion rate has to be calculated as on the date of payment and hence the respondent company has to pay the remaining amount. However the NCDRC has taken a different view while interpreting Clause 17 of the agreement and concluded that conversion rate has to be as on the date of subject shipment for which the invoice was issued and as the full amount with the same calculation is paid by the respondent, NCRDC has dismissed the revision petition.

In a contractual matter, when the decree is silent with regard to the reckoning date of conversion of foreign currency in to Indian repees, what would be the methodology to be followed by the Execution Court is no more res integra.

In conclusion, reading the judgment as a whole, without undertaking a piece meal approach as suggested by the appellant herein, interpreting the decree in a manner which may amount to substitution of a new decree is not countenanced under law. Therefore, it is clear that as per the insurance contract, the respondent insurer was required to pay the insurance claim in accordance with the conversation rate of the invoiced foreign currency in Indian rupee as per the bank buying rate of interest at Mumbai on the date of subject shipment for which the invoice was issued. We are apprised of the fact that the respondent-judgment debtor has paid an amount of Rs. 11,23,906/- to the petitioner during the pendency of execution proceedings. The aforesaid payment was calculated on the basis of conversion rate applicable at the time of shipment of invoiced value and the interest awarded by the consumer forum. In view of the same the respondent has complied with the order of the forum by paying full and final amount in terms of the order.
Meenakshi Saxena v. ECGC Ltd., 2018 (188) AIC 11 SC

No Civil Court can exercise jurisdiction of DRT or DRTA

The Hon’ble Dipak Misra, C.J.I., A.M. Khanwilkar and Dr. D.Y. Chandrachud, JJ., have held that after having considered the rival submissions of the parties, we have no hesitation in acceding to the argument urged on behalf of the Bank that the mandate of section 13 and, in particular, section 34 of the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 (for short, “the 2002 Act”). Clearly bars filing of a civil suit. For, no Civil Court can exercise jurisdiction to entertain any suit or proceeding in respect of any action taken or to be taken in pursuance of any power conferred by or under the Act.
State Bank of India v. Allwyn Alloys Pvt. Ltd., 2018 (188) AIC 269 SC

Leave a Comment